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Abstract
I bring forward some arguments to support the thesis that nature is
fundamentally discrete, and present my own thoughts about the di-
rection in which one could look for a possible, consistent “theory of
everything” describing gravitation and quantum particles.
Introduction: why the reals?
According to one point of view, particles are an “epiphenomenon” and the
fundamental theory is one of fields. Others think that the foundations of
physics are discrete, and that the continuous description is just a useful tool
at some level. The former approach is fairly standard in theoretical physics,
where one works out the “quantization” of classical fields.1 On the other
hand, various proposals going in the latter direction have appeared even
recently and are actively researched.2 So, the issue Niels Bohr thought he
settled with his complementarity principle actually continues to stir debates.
Now the discrete aspects in the physics of quantum particles are evident,
so a theory founded on continuous concepts has the problem of explaining
how discreteness actually arises; tentative arguments take a hint from the
1See for example the introduction of S. Weinberg’s The Quantum Theory of Fields,
Cambridge University press (1996).
2 For a sample of some of the threads see e.g.:
E.P. Verlinde, ‘On the Origin of Gravity and the Laws of Newton’, arXiv:1001.0785v1;
C. Rovelli, ‘Loop quantum gravity: the first twenty five years’, arXiv:1012.4707v3;
R.D. Sorkin, ‘Causal Sets: Discrete Gravity’, arXiv:gr-qc/0309009v1.
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2“vibration modes” of a bounded system (e.g. a string), but, as far as I know,
no definitely convincing results have been obtained.
Furthermore, we may note that saying that the foundations of physics are
continuous implies seeing the real numbers as a primitive concept. To me,
this seems disputable. The field R of reals is a highly abstract construction.
Its elements are defined to be certain equivalence classes of infinite sequences,
and have many non-intuitive properties. Most reals cannot be characterized
by finite information (the real numbers we deal with in practice constitute
a very small subset). The reason why they are so important is that in R
we can introduce a suitable notion of limit, and prove all those theorems
which make calculus consistent. In other terms, the reals provide us with a
powerful and sound context for calculations. This is not the same as saying
that they are to be included into the fundamental notions of physics. I’d
rather say that taking the reals for granted, and including differentiable
manifolds in the basic setting of a theory, amounts to starting from strong,
involved assumptions.
I’m not convinced by the contrary argument that the real numbers are
essential for calculations, and so should be included in the fundamental as-
sumptions. This idea, that calculability can’t be separated from the basic
assumptions, is actually widespread in theoretical physics; on the other hand
one may contend that a conceptually clearer theory, based on simpler as-
sumptions, may well require harder calculations (this point was explicitly
brought forward by Einstein himself).
What is a quantum particle?
Several discussions of basic aspects of Quantum Mechanics concern experi-
ments in which a particle source and a screen (the detector) are separated by
polarizing filters, or by a wall with slits, or whatever. In Young’s experiment
the wall has two slits, and in a classical context one would say that each
particle passes through one slit. Adjusting the source to be dimmer and
dimmer, the screen detects single particles; the time separation between two
conscutive flashes can be rendered large at will, but eventually the distri-
bution of the flashes sums up to the same interference pattern determined
by the bright source (that pattern is destroyed if one tries to detect the
particles at the slits).
So we detect certain quantum events, the absorption of single particles,
and we have good reasons to assume that each event is correlated to an
event occuring at the source, the emission of one particle. It’s then natural
3to view the particle exactly as this correlation between two observed events.
Though our (classical) mental habits would suggest that ‘something’ has
traveled from the first event to the second, this is not the right description
at a more fundamental level. The two events and their (abstract) correlation
are just everything that can be regarded as “real”.
Now suppose that some external Observer looks at our universe, not
being subjected to our universe’s time, and sees the whole spacetime at one
glance (the kosmos from the beginning to the end). This object looks to the
Observer as a (for us, huge and extremely complex) network of correlated
events. Considering a particular photon, the Observer might see that a
certain event, occured at recombination era 400,000 years after the big bang,
is correlated with an event occured at a radiotelescope on Earth 14 billion
years after the big bang. He might say that a photon was emitted at the
recombination era and detected 14 billion years later, but not that something
was wandering all this time through the cosmos, waiting to be detected. For
the Observer, only events and their correlations exist.
We humans can’t observe the kosmos in the same way but may have,
at some given time, an incomplete knowledge. We may have detected an
emission event, or know that it has occurred, but could not spot (at least, not
yet) the correlated absorption event, which however must occur somewhere,
at some time. This does not mean that we can say nothing about it, actually
we can calculate quantum probabilities: knowing about the emission event
allows one to calculate the probability that the absorption event takes place
in a certain position at a given time.
Spacetime and gravitation
The network of correlated events, where each correlation is called a “par-
ticle”, constitutes a discrete structure; now, rather than assume that it is
contained in something else, we could view it as the fundamental reality, at
least as far as our investigation can go. Perhaps there exists no underly-
ing continuum, and spacetime and its metric arise as mathematical notions
which are suitable for describing the universe on macroscopic scales. They
might be of a statistical nature, analogous to thermodynamical functions.
Thus a consistent formulation of the fundations of physics could be achieved
not requiring a unification in the usual sense that all interactions should be
on the same footing. In particular, gravitation could be seen as a kind of
“residual” force, emerging in the macroscopic description and not mediated
4by any particle. Though this sounds similar to Verlinde’s ideas,3 actually
I see it as a more radical ansatz, involving the complete elimination of the
geometry from fundamental notions. It’s also, in my opinion, the most pos-
sible relational ansatz.4 As far as I know, the closest ideas to what I’m
trying to convey, in the literature, have been expressed by Penrose.5 Let me
quote a few sentences of his:
“The idea is to concentrate only on things which are discrete
in existing theory and try and use them as primary concepts—
then to build up other things using these primary concepts as
the basic building blocks. Continuous concepts could emerge in
a limit, when we take more and more complicate systems.
...
The central idea is that the system defines the geometry... The
notion of space comes out as a convenience at the end.”
Though several developments—Regge calculus, the theory of spin net-
works, loop gravity—are in some way related to those ideas, I’m not aware
that that program has been carried on to the point of obtaining definite
results supporting such clear-cut positions. Thus I’d like to speculate a lit-
tle about how one could try and exploit the above arguments in order to
construct a true theory.
Consider a chunk of the network of events, and draw
the correlations as lines of various types. Well, I
know that this resembles a Feynman diagram, and
that such diagrams are to be considered just helps
for calculations, having nothing to do with reality;
however I’m not going to treat it really as a Feyn-
man diagram, and certainly I’m not saying that the
lines represent paths in some space, so please follow
me for the moment. The lines here bear various types of labels, but none
is related to spacetime in any way. Let’s say that the labels refer to an
“internal” structure. Since this diagram is only a piece of the big structure,
it has “external legs”. Our fundamental problem could then be formulated
as follows: given a large such network, find out how the internal structure
3Quoted in footnote 2.
4For a discussion of this concept see for example C. Rovelli, ‘Half way through the
woods’, Lecture presented at the ‘34th Annual Lecture Series’ of the Center for the Phi-
losophy of Science of the University of Pittsburgh (1994).
5Penrose, R.: ‘Angular momentum: an approach to combinatorial space-time’, in
Quantum Theory and Beyond—essays and discussions arising from a colloquium, Bastin
T. editor, Cambridge Univ. Press, Cambridge (1971), 151–180.
5may yield some kind of geometric relations among the external legs. These
relations won’t be exact, but only determined up to some degree of precision,
which we expect to be bigger the larger the considered network. In practice
we’ll have to study possible ways, compatible with the internal structure,
of immersing the network into some hypothetic geometry; note that this
immersion can be (partially) determined only up to certain transformations
of the geometry (only the geometrical relations among the external legs
have physical meaning). Furthermore, note that we don’t need to leave this
hypothetic large scale geometry completely undetermined; actually we may
choose one as part of our theoretical assumptions, then one task of our study
will be to understand how reasonable our choice was (by the way, this point
is deeply related to the philosphical question of the modalities of knowledge,
which I won’t examine here).
Now let me quote Penrose again:
“The most obvious physical concept that one has to start with,
where quantum mechanics says something is discrete, and which
is connected to the structure of space-time in a very intimate
way, is in angular momentum.”
Actually spin, or “intrinsic angular momentum”, is perhaps the most funda-
mental aspect of the internal structure of particles; its intimate and subtle
relation to spacetime geometry must have a deep explanation.6 Now I sug-
gest that, rather than dealing with arbitrary spin networks, we could get to
the core of the question by restricting our attention to a simplified situation
in which spin can only take the values 1/2 and 1; this encompasses elec-
trodynamics, which is essentially the source of almost all everyday physics,
classical and quantum (excluding gravity, which we aim at treating on a
different footing, and nuclear physics).
A chunk of the network of events, with the lines
indicating correlation stripped of all the internal
structure except what is needed for the present ar-
gument, could appear as illustrated here. Wavy
lines and straight lines represent (as in usual Feyn-
man diagrams) photons (spin 1) and fermions (spin
1/2), respectively; the arrows indicate the fermions’
charge sign; different fermion masses may be al-
lowed. Then, armed with one’s knowledge of the mathematical relation
between spin and the Lorentz metric of classical spacetime, one can study
6Part of my own mathematical work deals with such matters, e.g. see Acta Appl. Math.
62 N.2 (2000), 187–224, or my more recent papers posted on the arxiv.org website.
6possible correspondences of the legs with vectors in Minkowski space; pos-
sibly we might eventually find that a curved structure is needed for better
fitting. This aspect could be related to Regge calculus, but note that I
propose that the particles themselves be the network’s edges.
As for the calculation of quantum probabilities, at least one basic ques-
tion could be formulated not so differently from standard perturbative high
energy physics: given a set of “external legs”, try to associate a probabil-
ity to it by taking into account (at least in principle) all possible networks
having those external legs.
I know no details of how the above cues could be followed in practice, of
course (otherwise I’d have already published them). Let’s suppose, however,
that the scheme works more or less as imagined, and that, quoting Penrose
a further time, we succeeded in “building up both space-time and quantum
mechanics simultaneously—from combinatorial principles”; then we’d have
reached the goal of a peaceful cohabitation of quantum and gravitational
physics. Note, however, that neither is actually a fundamental theory in
this ansatz. Perhaps, rather than going on by building on existing theories
by adding more and more complicate features, we could try and change our
point of view of what is really fundamental.
By the way, I see this attitude as an expression of Ockham’s principle,
“entities should not be multiplied beyond necessity”, which today seems to
be more often forgotten than not.
Conclusions and futher speculations: software and
hardware
Imagine a very powerful computer, where a simulation of some virtual world
was implemented from basic entities. Certain rules of behaviour (call them
“physical laws”) have been assigned to these entities (“elementary parti-
cles”). Eventually the simulation grows so complex that intelligent beings
are born in this world, and begin to wonder about the ultimate nature of it.
How far can they reach in their quest? They could be so smart as to guess
the “physical laws”, namely to understand the software of the simulation;
but the knowledge of the hardware and of the programmer will be forever
unattainable for them (unless the programmer decides to insert some special
communication).
Well, this is utter speculation, hardly bearing any scientific weight; but
should we find that the foundations of physics are actually discrete, then
we’d be quite naturally led to see them as some kind of software.
